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The views expressed in this journal are not necessarily those of the Society.

Please note that the next edition of the Ethical Record will be a July/August/September issue and that the printed, or hard copy, version from then onwards will be quarterly. This decision has been taken in order to prioritise the accessibility, reach and immediacy of the online content of the Ethical Record. With more than 80% of our members choosing to engage with the online rather than the printed version, plus the fact that the online reach extends to every country on the planet, it makes sense for our resources to be realigned with how our content can be consumed and have more impact. Please see the Ethical Record section of www.conwayhall.org.uk for continually changing content and also check out the past issues where every issue published is archived going back to 1895!

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EDITORIAL

The Warnings of Fukushima

Guest Editor: Lis Fields

It has been an honour and a great pleasure to work with Conway Hall again on ‘20 millisieverts per year’, my second exhibition about the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear catastrophe.

In these politically and economically turbulent times, with so many voices silenced as the press and other institutions become increasingly compromised or devastated by austerity, Conway Hall is a sanctuary, providing intellectual and cultural nurture, which is more precious – and essential – than ever.

I feel honoured to have been entrusted with complete freedom with which to voice my knowledge and concerns about the multifaceted tragedy which continues to unfold in Fukushima and to give voice to some of the people who I met there in 2016.

The ’20 millisieverts per year’ exhibition title refers to the maximum dose of ionising radiation – originating from a nuclear power plant – to which the citizens of Fukushima can now be exposed. In the rest of Japan and the rest of the world the maximum permitted dose to citizens is 1 millisievert per year. Like many others I consider that this raising of the radiation dose threshold to 20 times the international standard poses an unacceptable risk to the health of these citizens and so represents a serious breach of human rights.

Any industrial or natural disaster which harms people, animals and the environment is a tragedy. But a nuclear disaster which releases the dangerous radioactive materials from a nuclear reactor into the environment engenders an additional layer of tragedy with the risk it poses not only to the health of those alive at the time but also to the health of future generations.

This is because ionizing radiation can irreversibly damage DNA which can lead to heritable illness and birth defects. The risk of this heritable damage to DNA is much greater if babies, children or people of childbearing age live in a radioactively contaminated area where they are continually exposed to ionizing radiation from radioactive materials introduced into their bodies via contaminated food, water and air.

I believe the Fukushima nuclear catastrophe embodies most of the destructive elements which threaten our very existence: the selfishness and greed manifested in those corporate practices which put ‘profits before people’ and the environment.

While other countries with nuclear power plants may not be as seismically active as Japan, or as prone to tsunamis, human error and the pressure on the nuclear industry to maximize profits are serious problems everywhere. With the escalation of climate disruption, terrorism and cyber terrorism, the risk of another catastrophic nuclear disaster, at any nuclear power plant, anywhere in the world, becomes ever greater.

I can only hope that we will be able to heed the warnings from Fukushima and take action before it’s too late.

The exhibition will run until 30 April 2017.

for more information please visit: www.lisfields.org

Lis Fields is a London-based artist, designer and mother with a keen interest in science, medicine and health, psychoanalysis, education, the environment and human rights. Her academic background is in science and art history with a BA (hons) degree which combined both subjects. Subsequently she has worked, inter alia, as a scientific researcher, director’s assistant in the film industry in Hollywood and as a professional artist and designer in New York City, Los Angeles and London.
CONWAY HALL

SUNDAY CONCERT

London Mozart Players & Howard Shelley

4 June 6.30pm

Haydn Symphony No.83 in G minor Hob.1/83
Mozart Piano Concerto No.1 in F K37
Mozart Piano Concerto No.27 in Bb K595
Myslivecek Symphony in C F.26

Tickets: £15
Is the Writing on the Wall for Liberal Democracy?

Dr Adrian Pabst

1. LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AFTER BREXIT AND TRUMP

Where do the Brexit vote and Donald Trump’s election leave liberal democracy? Both events are to do with the discontent of the disenfranchised and those experiencing economic and cultural insecurity. And both reveal that conventional politicians on the left and the right failed to understand this. But the unexpected – though perhaps unsurprising – result might tempt us to think that our model of democracy ultimately works and that majority trust in our political system has been restored. Have not Brexit and Trump given the economic losers a political

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victory over the economic winners for the first time since the New Deal following the 1929-32 Great Depression? Should we not welcome popular resistance against the politics of the Davos oligarchy that promotes the power and pleasure of a fortunate few over the flourishing of the forgotten many? Have not a majority risen up and challenged a creed of low wages, deindustrialisation, job-exporting trade deals, the deregulation of finance and endless war?

Perhaps so, but the crisis confronting Western politics is much deeper than the mechanics of mass democracy. Neither Britain’s EU referendum campaign nor the US election were characterised by a concern for truth and decency. In each case, the problem was about the sheer polarity of the debate and the false choices we were presented with: more technocracy or greater populism? And whatever their differences, both sides in these two contests engaged in a demagogical manipulation of either facts or emotion. Both appealed either to instrumental rationality or the unmediated will of ‘The People’ – not enlightened reason or people as they are in their families and communities. And both promote a plebiscite politics that locks democracy into a dialectical movement between empty theatrics and the power of oligarchy old or new.2

2. THE CRISIS OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY

After both world wars, liberal democracy expanded across and beyond the Western world, and following the end of the Cold War it seemed destined to become the world’s dominant political system – as symbolised by Francis Fukuyama’s prophesised ‘end of history’. Since the fall of totalitarian communism and the triumph of democratic capitalism, the expectation is that democracy deepens where it already exists and spreads to countries where it was previously suppressed. But for some time now the signs are that democratic standards have declined in mature democracies and that an authoritarian rollback is underway in new democracies.3

Examples of the former include the US since George W. Bush, the UK since Tony Blair or Italy since Silvio Berlusconi where we can observe increasing disaffection with established political parties, representative government and minority rights. All the achievements, which many assumed were widely approved by citizens of all ages, are now being rejected by a growing proportion of the population, especially the younger generation. A majority of people aged 18-30 in countries as diverse as Turkey, Russia, Germany and Spain no longer view democracy as essential and want to see political rule freed from the constraints of democracy.

Meanwhile, recently democratised countries that are now becoming more authoritarian are not limited to the cases of Russia or Venezuela but also extend to the apparently successful transitions in Hungary and Poland. Once the poster boys of democratic transition, both countries are experiencing an assault on the freedom and independence of courts, NGOs and the media, combined with growing ideological polarisation and political witch-hunt.4 In Hungary, the Fidesz government led by the Prime Minister Victor Orban has enacted constitutional reforms with the effect of undermining checks and balances in relation to the judiciary, the supervision of elections and public broadcasting. In Poland, the ruling Law and Justice Party has attacked the independence of the country’s constitutional court, taken control of the state media and denounced civil society organisations that are supposed to hold government accountable. In short, when it comes to former transition countries, a backsliding into the extremism of the hard left and the radical right akin to the 1930s is no longer unthinkable.

3. CONCEPTUALISING THE CRISIS

The current crisis of liberal democracy is not new but an intensification of some long-standing developments. Certain forms of liberalism undermine democracy, just like certain forms of democracy undermine liberal principles. What might seem like a match in heaven turns out to be an unholy alliance.

Scholars such as Colin Crouch, Sheldon Wolin and Peter Mair conceptualise this crisis in terms of ‘post-democracy’, the spectre of ‘inverted totalitarianism’ or the ‘hollowing out’ of democratic politics.5 Connecting these concepts is the argument that the post-war period of democratisation has given way to a concentration of power in the hands of small groups that are unrepresentative and unaccountable, as exemplified by the nexus between transnational
corporations and national governments. However, my argument is that post-democracy and cognate concepts do not fully capture the slide of liberal democracy into oligarchy, demagogy and anarchy. First of all, democratic rule is associated with the rise of a new oligarchy that strengthens executive power at the expense of parliament and people. Second, liberal democracy has witnessed the resurgence of populism and demagogy, which are linked to a backlash against technocratic rule and procedural politics. Third, liberal democracies have seen the emergence of anarchy connected with the atomisation of society and a weakening of social ties and civic bonds. In consequence, liberal democracy risks sliding into a form of ‘democratic despotism’ that maintains the illusion of freedom and equality while generating what Alexis de Tocqueville called ‘voluntary servitude’ – a seemingly free submission to power that is oligarchic, demagogic and anarchic.

My argument is not that democracy is becoming the same as dictatorship but rather that liberal democracy can mutate into novel forms of illiberal authoritarianism. A new oligarchy seeks to centralise power, concentrate wealth and manipulate public opinion by using media spin, closing down debate and ironing out plurality. The process whereby democratic rule becomes debased and even ‘despotic’ encompasses a series of mutations within democracy itself. Among others, these include elected representatives and governments that act as an interested, self-serving party; a corporate capture of the state; a collective de-mobilisation of the citizenry; a cult of abstract equality; the conceit that the West’s democratic system is the only valid model.

4. HOW DEMOCRACY UNDERMINES LIBERALISM AND REPRESENTATION

Just as liberalism threatens democracy, so too democracy threatens liberal principles such as incontestable property ownership, the rule of law and the rights of individuals defined as belonging to a recognised minority. Like atomistic liberalism, unqualified democracy has a kind of spatial bias: it supposes that we are all contracting and compromising individuals within a sort of eternalised agora – or assembly in the central spot of a polis. But this is to deny life and the flowing of life as a perpetual glissando through time. Life is not simply democratic, because it is both spontaneously creative and giving: with the arrived child, something new emerges. We must give to this child nurture, but from the outset the child reverses this hierarchy by revealing her unique creative power of response.

No social contract can be involved here, and for this reason, pure unqualified democracy tends to deny the priority of time, the sanctity of life, the importance of the child, old age, death and political participation beyond mere synchronic procedure. Democracy’s ‘normal’ person is rather the freely choosing and contracting, Audi-owning autonomous 31-year-old. But no human person is forever like this; it is, rather, only a moment in a coming to be and passing away.

Thus by ignoring time, purely representative democracy fails to consider the necessarily constitutive cultural dimension of transmission, learning and guided debate. In consequence, all that can finally be voted for is the triumph of the will – the collective will, which, in order to be ‘collectivised’ without real educative influence or debate, must be shaped and led by a secretly or avowedly tyrannical leadership. From Rousseau onwards, the ‘general will’ and the role of the overruling ‘legislator’ are necessarily linked. And we have known ever since Robespierre that the ‘general will’ enacted by the ‘legislator’ can be anarchic, tyrannical and anti-human.

Moreover, liberalism is about the individual will; democracy is about mass will, directly or representatively expressed. The former may exclude or even disdain the latter; the latter may entirely override the former. Crucially, the power that mediates between these two nominally sovereign wills is necessarily the state, which combines coercive with regulatory powers, both of which are necessary but not sufficient for a plural polity. What is missing from the liberal state is some sort of extra-voluntarist understanding. Such an understanding would have to equitably exceed a merely temporary consensus as to just when, where and to what extent we should balance spheres of individual decision with spheres of shared determination. Equally, one can only justify the role of democracy, or of collective assent, if one assumes that there is, in fact, an objective common good, including a region of shared substantive flourishing
to be sought – to whatever degree its nature must remain a matter of continual debate and discernment.

Thus, paradoxically, the real rationale for democracy is *extra-*democratic: the legitimacy of popular assent consists not in an aggregated will. Rather, it consists in the likelihood that a relatively well educated – morally trained and informed – populace will be better able to sift and refine proposals as to what is ‘best’ for them by genuinely ‘aristocratic’ thinkers and innovators at every level. It is also crucial that the good not only be done, but that it be done willingly and with general assent – else it will be constantly and inevitably thwarted. Without this extra-democratic rationale for democracy, democracy will be identified with a new kind of tyranny – the imposition or manipulation of will.

Finally, modern ‘representation’ remains, properly understood, a ‘mixed’ system. It contains both ‘aristocratic’ and ‘monarchic’ elements, even though it has a proper bias to democracy. Normally, the former means groups of ‘wise men and women’ and the latter has to be in some fashion literally embodied in one person, as it still is today, throughout the world, in the mode of presidential and prime ministerial functions. Liberal democracy’s neglect of aristocratic and monarchical elements of the mix has helped to foment democratic crisis, since any non-purely direct democracy paradoxically requires them for its functioning and even for the encouragement of informal and participatory democracy as opposed to a merely formal one. On this view then, strictly speaking, ‘representative democracy’ is a misnomer because ‘the few’ and ‘the one’ are involved as well as the ‘many’. Any mandatory conception of democracy tends ironically to empower an oligarchic and manipulative executive speaking in the name of the people, whom they really manipulate. Trump may be both a reaction against this and a writing of it large. The US system has always been too oligarchic and has always provoked a populist resistance to this. As Trump’s triumph suggests, the republic is in danger of Caesarian reversal.

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The new leadership of the Green Party has called for a “progressive alliance” involving Labour, Greens, Plaid Cymru, the SNP and the Lib Dems to take on the Conservatives in a 2020 election. On 5 February 2017, Jonathan Bartley (Co-Leader, Green Party), Peter Taheri (Secretary/Chair Nominee, Hampstead and Kilburn Labour Party) and Timothy Barnes (Conservative candidate for Bloomsbury Ward 2018) discussed this proposition, or whether the way forward in the UK is best left to one of the established main parties. Jonathan Bartley outlines his position.

Jonathan Bartley is co-leader of the Green Party with Caroline Lucas MP and the Party’s Work and Pensions Spokesperson. He has a passion for social justice and studied Social Policy at London School of Economics. He worked in Parliament on a cross-party basis from 1994-1998 and used that experience in his roles as vice chair of the electoral reform society and vice chair of Yes to Fairer Votes campaign during the 2011 referendum.
Our democracy is broken. How else to explain the depth of the divisions that scar our country, which were revealed in all their visceral rawness by the bleak, bitter EU referendum campaign and its aftermath?

It has shown the divisions within political parties are as large as the divisions between them. If we are to heal both our country and our democracy, then we urgently need to build a progressive alliance for electoral reform. The alternative is the chilling prospect of Tory rule for a generation, with all the social and environmental destruction that would bring with it.

Progressive politics is not dead – but let’s not pretend that it is not staring death in the face. Just look at the polls.

The situation is not explained by a lack of enthusiastic supporters. Labour is Europe’s biggest socialist party, my own party’s membership is more than four times bigger than it was five years ago. The Lib Dems and the SNP have been buoyed by swelled ranks in recent years.

The situation is not explained by the ruling party governing well, either. The country is in chaos, whichever way you look at it. We’ve been steered out of Europe with no clear plan about where we are heading. Our NHS is broken – with people waiting in corridors for treatment. Local Government is buckling under the strain imposed by central Government. Our welfare state is being weaponised against those who can’t fight back. The truth is that we are failing at a time when we should be winning.

There are some who put the blame for this failure entirely on individuals and, if we’re honest, on Jeremy Corbyn particularly. But we – collectively – lost the last election and we’re now living with the consequences. Yes, my party has our criticisms of Jeremy’s leadership of Labour - we wouldn’t be a separate party if we didn’t - but the blame for our current predicament does not rest on his shoulders.

To prevent the formation of a UKIP driven Tory government that will maximise an extreme Brexit, I believe we should explore the possibility of a pre-election agreement between progressive parties, and the glue holding together such a pact would be a commitment to proportional representation. Because that is the antidote to a sick electoral system which produces Governments with the votes of just 24% of those eligible to vote. The movement for PR has grown – already it is supported by the SNP (even though it would play against them), by Plaid, the Lib Dems, the Green Party and increasingly by members of the Labour Party.

Simply put, anyone who wants to stop progressive party politics dying needs to actively support real democracy and proportional representation, and the best route to that is through a progressive alliance.

How would such an agreement actually work? Firstly it does not mean stitching things up behind closed doors. This has to be an open, inclusive, bottom up process, involving as many people as possible in each local area.

One proposal would be to hold open primaries to elect the best progressive candidate – either in every constituency or just in marginals where an electoral alliance could make most impact – which could provide unprecedented democratic legitimacy and harness a wave of grassroots excitement and energy.

There are plenty of other scenarios, from individual party candidates signing up to a set of core progressive principles, perhaps championed by a third party movement – a concept explored by Guardian journalist Stephen Moss last year with his Platform proposal – to less formal non-aggression agreements.

I know a progressive pact is not an easy concept, especially for people who have spent hours banging on doors for a party they really believe in. But my plea to other parties is quite simple: let’s at least explore whether some form of joint working might deliver us a progressive Government in 2020.

The bottom line is that the alliance needs to empower individuals, not party elites, and better reflect the diversity of opinion that is at the heart of modern Britain. No one party has a monopoly on wisdom and we are better working together.
The election and assumption to office of President Trump in January 2017 and the Brexit vote and its unfolding implications have led to widespread discussions as to whether we are heading towards a “dystopia”. In the last month sales of Orwell’s *Nineteen Eighty-Four* have been massive, as concerned onlookers plumb the past for parallels with the present. The term “dystopia” evokes ideas of catastrophe and apocalypse, or, at the very least, images of Hitler, Stalin and the tyrannical and murderous regimes of the 1930s and 1940s. But is this an overreaction - or should we be genuinely concerned that society is deteriorating towards some awful collapse?

Readers might be aided here by a poster called “Early Warning Signs of Fascism” which has been widely circulated on the internet. It lists fourteen things to be wary of:

1. Powerful and continuing nationalism;
2. Disdain for human rights;
3. Identification of Enemies/Scapegoats as a Unifying Cause;
4. Supremacy of the Military;
5. Rampant sexism;
6. Controlled mass media;
7. Obsession with national security;
8. Religion and government are intertwined;
9. Corporate power is protected;
10. Labour power is suppressed;
11. Disdain for intellectuals and the arts;
12. Obsession with crime and punishment;

**Gregory Claeys** has been Professor of the History of Political Thought at the Royal Holloway University of London since 1992. His main research interests lie in the fields of social and political reform movements from the 1790s to the early 20th century. He has just had published by Oxford University Press the first monograph devoted to the concept of dystopia, entitled *Dystopia a Natural History*. He has spoken several times at the Ethical Society, including on Thomas Paine and J.S. Mill.
13. Rampant cronyism and corruption;  
14. Fraudulent elections.

I have dealt with many of these features (amongst others) in my recent book, *Dystopia: A Natural History* (Oxford University Press, 2016). This includes not only an account of the emergence and development of literary dystopianism, but also an account drawing extensively from group psychology as to how we should conceive of dystopian social interaction; and an historical overview of the leading political dystopias of the 20th century, focussing on Hitler, Stalin and Pol Pot. In what follows here I want briefly to address how the history of literary dystopias helps us to comprehend debates about the political dystopia (which is what the poster warns of) as well as of two further types of dystopia, the technological and the environmental.

At the outset this typology indicates the need to define our key term. “Dystopia” is usually used to describe “very bad” places by contrast to (e)utopia, the ideally “good” place often associated with Thomas More’s *Utopia* (1516). We quickly discover, however, that this definition does not take us far. Many utopias have dystopian features, and many utopias seemingly rely on war, slavery or subservience to guarantee the privileged position of some. Thus More’s society has widespread surveillance and restrictions on travel and free speech, as well as slavery and imperialism, while in George Orwell’s *Nineteen Eighty-Four* a privileged inner party subsists on the oppression of the rest of the population. Many utopias, indeed, it seems, are someone else’s dystopia. Nonetheless it is possible to posit a spectrum of utopian/dystopian societies defined by friendship, trust and solidarity at the utopian end to fear, anxiety and oppression at the dystopian.

What does the dystopian literary tradition tell us about this spectrum? Until the 1980s political dystopias were predominant here. The tradition commences with satires on the collectivism of the French revolution, and enjoys its first major expansion in the highly controversial critical reception of Edward Bellamy’s *Looking Backward 2000-1887* (1888), a now largely unknown text which proposed a scheme of highly centralised collectivist management of the American economy. The genre subsequently centres, however, on anti-Bolshevism and anti-collectivism, notably in Evgeny Zamiatin’s *We* (1924) and in Orwell’s great work, the best-selling (over 20 million copies) and definitive centrepiece of the canon. In the late 19th century, however, we begin to see the other two subgenres emerging, and by the early 20th century, the three subgenres intermingling. Hostility to machinery is first central to Samuel Butler’s *Erewhon* (1872), where the possibility emerges of machines evolving qualitatively as humans had from apes. A specific focus on robots is present from slightly later, and is often identified with E.M Forster’s famous essay, “The Machine Stops” (1909) and then Karel Čapek’s play *R.U.R.* (1920), both of which extend the Frankenstein motif into technology. Following the catastrophe of World War I, political and technological utopian themes were often combined in the suggestion that humanity was increasingly driven to imitate and think like machines, notably through uniformity, efficiency and conformism. These themes are also satirised in what is usually regarded as the second great “standard” text in the tradition, Aldous Huxley’s *Brave New World* (1932). But this is a very different text from Orwell’s classic. The latter gives us a basic dystopia vocabulary based on concepts like Big Brother, telescreen, doublethink, Newspeak, thoughtcrime. Huxley by contrast describes a eugenically-engineered despotism based on “ectogenesis, neo-Pavlovian conditioning & hypnopedia”, and a satire on mandatory sexual promiscuity and indulgence in the wondrous drug Soma which made readers in the 1960s wonder if this was not utopia rather than dystopia. (It was not: Huxley wrote another novel, *Island* (1962) to show the difference.)

Our sense of impending disaster altered after World War II firstly through the invention of nuclear weapons, and secondly through the prospect, first evident by the late 1960s, of environmental catastrophe through pollution, resource depletion and overpopulation. A trend towards seeing middle class conformism in affluent societies as inherently dangerous is still evident (think of Ray Bradbury’s *Fahrenheit 451*, 1953). But as fear of Stalinism retreated new threats moved increasingly to centre stage. Two, very topical today, clearly merit mention: the blossoming of fundamentalist religious and anti-feminist dystopianism, e.g. in Margaret Atwood’s classic, *The Handmaid’s Tale* (1985), and a
resurgence of concern with total surveillance in the age of the internet, the key theme in Dave Eggers’ *The Circle* (2013). In addition to these, overpopulation is already a key theme by the 1960s (e.g. Harry Harrison’s *Make Room! Make Room!,* 1966).

So where then do we stand today vis-à-vis these trends? Observers were alarmed when President Trump’s advisor Kellyanne Conway described as an “alternative fact” the view that his inauguration had been extremely well attended, when photographic and other evidence indicated the contrary. The constant stream of downright lies, distortions and fabrications to emerge from the Trump campaign and now presidency also indicate a hostility not only to the so-called “fake media”, but to any “truth” not favourable to Trump. Such a callous reduction of “news” to mere propaganda we can associate with the Murdoch-owned Fox News in the first instance, but equally with Stalinism and Orwell’s MiniTrue. Here the pursuit of an allegiance to “truth” is in retreat, replaced by extreme (“alt-right”) propaganda designed to favour one viewpoint, which is increasingly hostile to Islam, feminism and ideologies which promote social equality. In Orwell’s understanding, power-worship has here supplanted a desire to defend any conception of “objective truth”. The consequences and implications are frightening indeed. Some readers have also returned to Sinclair Lewis’s classic *It Can’t Happen Here* (1935) to ask whether this portrait of domestic American fascism has contemporary purchase. Here an agenda of “America First” is clearly combined with an aggressive capitalist desire to undermine the European Union (and in the UK, to penetrate markets hitherto blocked off, for example with a view to privatising the NHS). The worrisome prospect of a puppet Trump being manipulated by the Russian bear adds additional alarm to the scenario.

Secondly, however, if interwoven with Trump’s designs, the idea of environmental apocalypse gains increasingly both in momentum and credibility as the 21st century advances. Sceptics with respect to global warming ignore the actual temperature rises which have come alarmingly swiftly in the past decade. Scenarios such as that suggested by Mark Lynas (*Six Degrees. Our Future on a Hotter Planet,* 2007) indicate that a failure to restrain this trend will indeed mean that this is likely to be mankind’s final century. “If you want a picture of the future”, says Winston Smith’s torturer O’Brien, “imagine a boot stamping on a human face for ever”. We should not imagine that the political dystopia is irrelevant in our own times, however. (But the boot will be up to its ankle and then knee in water.) Our epoch is marked once again by the proliferation of many sources of anxiety and fear, from immigration/xenophobia to terrorism, unemployment, austerity and civilizational collapse. Now, however, the three basic types of dystopian narrative come to merge more clearly than ever before. Identifying these narratives through analysis and debate will not make them go away. But at least we have some sense of where we have come to reach the present.
How Should the West Handle North Korea?

Simon Buckby

THE KIM CULT

Current North Korean national legend is very easily summarised. The Koryo Dynasty, between 918 and 1392, unified the peninsula. This was followed by what is called “feudal rule” until 1910, which was ended only by Japanese occupation. The Great Leader Kim Il Sung was born in 1912 (this is effectively year zero, the date that starts the Juche calendar, making 2016 103; you see both dates everywhere). He began fighting against the Japanese in the 1920s until he successfully overthrew them in 1945, when he set up the Workers’ Party of Korea. As the country was divided by Soviet-American deadlock along the 38th parallel, he became Prime Minister of the socialist north. He then defended the DPRK from US invasion in 1950 before defeating them in 1953. And history seems to more or less stop there.

There are two guiding philosophies. The Juche Idea, which is a code of self-reliance (for the country
not for individuals of course). And the Songun Policy, which means “army-first”.

After Kim Il Sun’s death he was succeeded in 1994 by his son, the Dear Leader Kim Jong Il, who in turn was followed in 2011 by his son, the Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un. (The public is not told when he was born, how he was educated or where he lives, though they do know he smokes.) The three Kim’s are revered as gods and the deceased pair in particular are mythologised obsessively.

The most obvious expression of this is the giant identical portraits, with their benign countenances, outside every public building across the country (each home also has to display the same two photos inside), the colossal mosaics at the side of roads everywhere, and the gargantuan statues in public squares and the foyers of everything from factories to swimming pools.

The biggest statues, at 20m tall, are the Mansudae Grand Monument in the centre of Pyongyang. There is a runway leading up to them from the River Taedong about a kilometre away. To the left there is a huge monument to war against Japan; to the right one against America. (This is very close to the iconic Chollima Monument, which symbolises the advance of the socialist society.)

People come from all over the country to pay homage here (everyone has to bow before these and many, many other statues and pictures). As we arrived, hundreds of villagers were waiting their turn. They were obviously not familiar with foreigners because as we walked past them every pair of eyes followed us every step of the way. We then watched them lay the national flower – the magnolia, which is often seen surrounding mosaics of the leaders – and line up to bow. It is a shocking sight (though it is equally shocking how quickly you get used to it). We had to do the same.

On the western outskirts of the city, we are shown the Mangyongdae “native house”. This perfectly preserved village dwelling, alone in the forest now that every other building has been cleared, is supposedly where Kim Il Sung was born and raised until the age of 14 when he went off to fight the Japanese.
The other end of this story is told at one of the most awe-inspiring tourist attractions on the planet: the Kumsusan Mausoleum. The residence of Kim Il Sung during his lifetime, a 30 minute drive north west of Pyongyang, has been turned into the tombs of Lenin plus Mao multiplied by Gracelands then subtracted from however you used to think the world works, and is now the vast vault where Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il lie embalmed in glass coffins.

It is open to foreigners only on Sundays when locals have to wait until we have all entered. For men, it is compulsory to wear closed shoes, trousers (not jeans) and a shirt collar (a tie is merely desirable); for women, shoulders and knees have to be smartly covered. We walk in crocodile formation, headed by our more than usually jumpy guides, one tour group at a time, through the machine that cleans our shoes and the wind tunnel that blows dust from our clothes. Then we are not allowed to walk at all as it is thought disrespectful. Instead, we have to stand on a series of travelators and escalators that transport us at least 1,000 metres past hundreds of titanic portraits of the two leaders (typically with one of them pointing to the far distance while lackeys appear to take down their every word in open notebooks), past dozens of female sentinels (all in their mid 20s, with identical uniforms, identical physiques and even identical haircuts), while we listen to music (we are told that the two songs on an infinite loop are Kim Il Sung Will Always Be With Us and Kim Jong Il Will Always Be With Us).

We are deposited in a massive marble gallery, which leads to another, and another, all adorned with the same kinds of photos and sentries. There is another wind tunnel. Then we finally enter the chamber smothered in red neon light that contains at its centre the glass coffin within which Kim Il Sung is displayed. One group at a time, we file towards the feet and bow, walk clockwise to the left hand side and bow again, then walk around the head to the right hand side and bow yet again. When we exit we are confronted by several halls containing Kim Il Sung's train, cars and other possessions. On another floor, the exact same rooms are replicated for an identical experience at the tomb of Kim Jong Il.

The whole route takes about 3 hours to complete and as the foreign tourists exit on the moving-walkways, swapping notes on the astonishing experience we have just had, on the opposite travelators come the locals: deathly silent, rock still, zombified. The men in white shirts and red ties, the women in gorgeous balloon dresses, they have come to mourn.

THE PARTY LINE

We were told that every home has a radio concreted into the walls that comes on automatically each morning and evening to blast out music, news and propaganda that cannot be turned off. Revolutionary songs, often allegedly composed by Kim Il Sung or his father, are blared from official vans that drive around the streets, as well as piped into public squares, hotel
lobbies and even train carriages on the underground system. Instead of advertising hoardings there are socialist realism posters all over the place.

There is what seems to be a fully functioning underground system, at least the parts that we saw. There are 17 stations along two lines in the west of the city. We travelled four stops through typically named stations. Starting at Glory, then Torch, Victory and Reunification, coming out at Triumph. The platforms are packed with commuters reading the day’s newspapers pinned up on display boards.

The very few cars on the roads are controlled by a series of “traffic ladies”: all are young, unmarried, dressed in matronly uniforms, and waving bright orange sticks. They are stationed at every junction in the city centre, robotically turning their feet and their heads to see in all directions, viscously whistling at anyone going a bit fast, and saluting at official party cars (about one in three; virtually all the others are taxis; old-fashioned bicycles and battery-powered cycles are more affordable and popular). Pedestrians have to use zebra crossings or risk losing their jobs.

Running parallel to the River Taedong all the way down to the Grand Theatre in the south west is the broad boulevard of Victory Street. We walked down it – one of the few places we were allowed to get out of the minibus except when visiting a specific building – and saw smoky bars packed with local men, along with a home ware shop and a hairdressers. This is also where soldiers goosestep and weapons parade on ceremonial occasions.

It cuts through one end of Kim Il Sung Square, the main plaza, surrounded by ministerial buildings and the National Art Gallery (this is notable because the paintings are presented with two dates: when they were painted; and when they were first seen by one of the leaders). Here we saw hundreds of people practicing their performances – singing, drumming and flag-waving – for the Liberation Day celebrations on 15 August. This included a number called Home Sickness, which was by all accounts Kim Il Sung’s, and therefore the nation’s, favourite (a song written, obviously, by Kim Il Sung himself).

Opposite Kim Il Sung Square on the other side of the river is the 170m tall Juche Idea Tower. There is a great view from the top, not least of the May Day Stadium, on a northerly island, with pushing 200,000 seats the largest sports arena in the world. This is the home of the Mass Games, when hundreds of thousands of citizens, after practicing for months, perform synchronised gymnastics and ballet to tell epic stories. It used to be held every August to October, but has not occurred since 2013. Instead, for Liberation Day and other public holidays, there is Mass Dancing, a smaller affair held in front of the singers in public squares. Also on the east side is the enormous party monument, a sculpture featuring the hands of a worker, a peasant and an intellectual.

At these and other sights, your tour guides hand you over to female “local guides”, all dressed alike (in traditional costume, which interestingly is the exact same dress you see at tourist sites in South Korea), with the same hairstyles (these vary in the South), whose job is to constantly reinforce the party line about the leaders and the socialist revolution as well as the imperialist aggressors from the United States and Japan and the puppet regime in Seoul. Nowhere does this happen more professionally than at the no-expense-spared Victorious Fatherland Liberation War Museum, built in 2013 to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the end of the Korean War.

It is more than a hundred metres from the entrance gate to the Victory Statue – it goes without saying that this is mammoth – flanked by captured US military hardware on one side (including the USS Pueblo, the only American commissioned vessel currently held captive anywhere in the world, having been seized for spying in a major Cold War incident in 1968) and North Korean army stuff on the other. Inside, an absorbing 20 minute video tells a tale of how the Americans invaded in 1950, then Kim Il Sung fought them off before a strategic retreat led to the peace treaty of 1953. The whole museum builds to a superb giant rotating drum with a 360 degree panorama of one great battle scene: a painting in the round, foregrounded with full-scale military mannequins and real tanks, overlaid with a dramatic sound and video performance. You then exit through the gift shop, though the gifts are largely restricted to the 50 volume complete works of Kim Il Sung.

There are two war cemeteries worth visiting. The one for the martyrs who fought America is in the north of the city right next to the road to the airport. The one for those who died fighting Japan, apparently including Kim Il Sung’s mother and brother, is out by the Kumsusan Mausoleum, near the zoo.
As with many great discoveries they were found by chance. We had been working at Happisburgh for over a decade, but visited in May 2013 to continue geophysics on the beach. It was my colleague, Dr Martin Bates, who first spotted them. Lying on ancient estuary muds, he had found the oldest footprints outside Africa, dating to at least 800,000 years ago.

Happisburgh lies on the Norfolk coast between Cromer and Great Yarmouth. The soft cliffs of clays, silts and sands have been ravaged for centuries by the sea, but this has accelerated in recent years perhaps

Nick Ashton has been a curator at the British Museum for over 30 years, specialising in Lower and Middle Palaeolithic archaeology. He has directed and published major excavation projects in Britain and is currently Co-Director of the Pathways to Ancient Britain Project. His work focuses on the earliest occupation of northern Europe, the early human adaptation to northern environments and the investigation of when Britain first became an island.
due to the concrete defences to the north and south. As the cliffs erode back they reveal dark organic muds and gravels at their base that we call the Cromer Forest-bed. It is not a single bed, but a complex series of river and estuary deposits that were laid down over hundreds of thousands of years by eastward flowing rivers. They were eventually overlain by glacial sediments about 450,000 years ago that form the 10 m high cliffs that we see today.

For over two centuries the Cromer Forest-bed has been famous for the discoveries of fossil bones of mammoth, rhino and hippo together with fossilised wood and other plant remains, but no convincing evidence of humans. In March 2000 local resident Mike Chambers was walking his dog across a large expanse of forest-bed that was exposed at low tide. Embedded in the mud was what appeared to be a humanly worked black flint. It was in fact a handaxe.

The discovery led to extensive fieldwork initially near the site of the handaxe, but also at other exposures up and down the coast. We now have at least five sites, the youngest of which is the handaxe location of Site 1, dating to 500,000 years ago. One of the most intriguing sites lies somewhere offshore, but we have yet to discover where. We know of its existence due to large blocks of concreted gravel that contain wood, pollen, but also bone with cut-marks from human butchery. The blocks have been torn away from an offshore reef and through future survey and diving we hope to find out where.

It is Site 3 that has produced the most remarkable evidence. It lies about 1 km north-west of Site 1 and thankfully for us, slightly further up the beach and less prone to the tides. It was discovered in 2005 and consists of a complex series of river channels and estuary sediments, which preserve rich environmental remains. Pollen, wood and other plants indicate regional vegetation dominated by coniferous forest. The more localised environment can be reconstructed from study of the insect remains suggesting that the site was near the estuary of a large river with a floodplain consisting of a mosaic of grassland, stands of alder, small pools and marsh. The valley was grazed by herds of deer, horse and bison, together with larger herbivores such as mammoth, rhino and hippo.

Coniferous forest suggests cooler conditions and this is supported by the beetles. As beetles often have very specific habitats and usually fly, they are quick to react to changes in environment and from their present-day distributions can be used to reconstruct past climate. Collectively they suggest summers that were similar to East Anglia today with an average of about 17°C. But the winters were 3 - 6° cooler than today’s average of 3°C. A modern day analogue would be southern Scandinavia or northern Germany, making winters a challenge to survive.

So what of the human evidence? This comes in the form of simple sharp-edged flint tools of flakes, notches and occasional scrapers, but significantly no handaxes. There are in fact only 80 artefacts excavated from the site despite eight seasons of digging that uncovered almost 400 m² of sediments. Importantly the artefacts come from different levels showing that humans were here for several generations.

Until May 2013 we thought this was the only human evidence, but then we discovered the footprints. Initially I was sceptical. There were a series of elongated hollows that I thought might be caused by
erosion or perhaps, simply modern footprints. The latter was quickly ruled out because the sediments are compacted and are no longer soft enough to take prints. Nor were there any erosional processes that would create elongated hollows, some of which were wider at one end.

I was still not fully convinced when we recorded them using digital imagery. Despite being May the weather was foul. Battling against wind, rain and a rising tide we managed to record them, but it was only when I was sent the processed 3D model by Sarah Duffy that I realised that they really were human footprints. Analysis of the prints shows a range of sizes from adults to children. The largest were probably made by an adult male with a foot-length equivalent to a UK size 8 or 9 and indicating a height of about 5 foot 8 inches (1.73 m). It is clear that we are dealing with a family group with at least five or six individuals. They appear to have paused at the estuary edge before continuing in a southerly direction.

So what is the age of the site? The mammalian fossils provide the main clue. The mammoth remains from an early form called *Mammuthus meridionalis*, which is known to have become extinct about 800,000 years ago. The horse, *Equus Suessenbornensis*, also became extinct about this time. By contrast an extinct giant elk, *Cervalces latifrons*, and red deer, *Cervus elaphus*, first evolved about a million years ago. The combination of these fossils means that the age of the site can be bracketed between 1 million and 800,000 years ago. This age is supported by the reversed palaeomagnetism recorded in the estuarine sediments, where minute iron minerals are orientated to the south, rather than north. The last major period of reversal ended about 800,000 years ago. Until recently it was thought that humans first reached northern Europe only 500,000 years ago. The dates for Happisburgh push this back by at least 300,000 years.

Unfortunately we have no human fossils in Britain that date to this period, but the closest site with remains is Atapuerca in northern Spain. Here we have bones and teeth from a species called *Homo antecessor* or ‘Pioneer Man.’ From measurement of the bones we know that the average males stood about 5 foot 8 inches (1.73 m) and the females about 5 foot 3 inches (1.68 m). These heights conform with what we know from Happisburgh. They looked similar to ourselves, being fully bipedal, though with a slightly

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*Figure 2. The footprint surface at Happisburgh Site 3 in May 2013. Photo: Simon Parfitt.*
smaller brain and different cranial structure. We also know that the Atapuerca human bones have cut-marks from stone tools, indicating butchery. A rather grisly conclusion is that these people were cutting the flesh off their relatives and neighbours and were perhaps cannibals.

Questions remain about how these people survived the long, cold winters of northern Europe. One suggestion is that they seasonally migrated. But to make any appreciable difference to winter temperatures they would have had to have travelled to the shores of the Iberian Peninsula or the Mediterranean. Even for adults this would have been a difficult journey, but virtually impossible with small children or elderly relatives.

An alternative is that they had functional body hair that gave them sufficient protection from the cold. There is an elegant hypothesis that humans lost their body hair over two million years ago on the savannahs of East Africa. The argument goes that with bipedalism there was less need for protection from the sun, leading to the loss of hair, other than the scalp. One of the evolutionary advantages was better thermoregulation through more efficient sweat glands, which also enabled longer day-time hunting. This may have been the case, but there is no direct proof. It may have had advantages for Africa, but there were serious short-comings for the more seasonal climates of Europe. So perhaps humans entering Europe from Africa still had body hair or it redeveloped as they evolved in more northerly latitudes.

But maybe the simplest answer to coping with cooler climates is that they had better control of fire and were more capable of making clothes and shelters than we previously thought. Unfortunately we have no evidence for the use of these technologies at this time – we simply do not have enough sites. Better evidence for ways of buffering against the cold start to be introduced from around 500,000 years ago. At High Lodge in Suffolk we have scrapers that were ideal tools for processing hides, presumably for building simple shelters or use as clothing. From 400,000 years ago at Beeches Pit, also in Suffolk, or Menez Dregan in Brittany, we have distinct hearths from fires. By this time we are also dealing with a different human species – either Homo heidelbergensis or very early Neanderthals. Perhaps it was these more advanced species, with brains approaching the size of modern humans, who introduced these new ways of dealing with winter cold.

But to return to Happisburgh at over 800,000 years ago, perhaps the biggest challenge was the short growing season of northern latitudes. This implied a greater dependence on meat and more effective scavenging or possibly hunting. If meat acquisition was a struggle, what other resources were available? The big advantage for Happisburgh was its estuary situation, providing important resources such as collectable shellfish and seaweed over those difficult winter months. Perhaps these pioneering populations were able to cope in northern Europe, but only in coastal or estuary situations.

There are still many questions to be answered about how early humans adapted to more northern environments from the equatorial and tropical habitats in which they first evolved. The Happisburgh humans were the pioneers of the day, reaching the northernmost limit for people at that time anywhere around the globe. They were pushing the natural boundaries of the known world and dealing with new challenges, which ultimately led to the provision of food, warmth and shelter – the basic human needs that we still need today.

**FURTHER READING**

A reply to Jan Williams' viewpoint ‘Response to Ray Ward’, published in March 2017’s Ethical Record (Vol 122, no. 2: 19-22), regarding her article ‘Prostitution: Chalk and Cheese’ which appeared in October 2016’s Ethical Record (Vol 121, no. 9: 10-12).

The reasons why most prostitutes are women are biological. Jan’s lurid picture of domination, helpless women, incapable of deciding anything, who must be “rescued” by people who know better, is offensive to many women. See Decriminalisation of Prostitution: The Evidence: Report of Parliamentary Symposium, 3 November 2015 (English Collective of Prostitutes (ECP), 2016; http://prostitutescollective.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Online-Symposium-Report.pdf). With contributions from sex workers’ organisations, academics, political parties, the Royal College of Nursing, Amnesty International, etc., I can only concentrate on points relevant to the “Nordic model” of criminalising clients.

As I said, much “evidence” comes from bodies helping people to leave prostitution, who will therefore encounter only such people, and trafficking is insanely exaggerated. Professor Nicola Mai found only 6% of migrant sex workers had been trafficked by deception or force. The ludicrous police raids in Soho and elsewhere “rescuing” trafficked women found few, if any (pp. 8, 29, 44-6, 65).

Dr Jay Levy found “no convincing empirical evidence that the law has resulted in a decline in sex work in Sweden”. Would-be clients risking arrest are rushed and unwilling to leave contact information. Workers have less chance to check for danger and are less able to refuse clients. Levy concluded that the law has had a devastating effect on the rights, health and safety of sex workers in Sweden (pp. 5-6, 32-3, 46-8). Much evidence remains untranslated; as Pye Jakobssen of the Swedish sex worker organisation Rose Alliance said: “Sweden has made sure no one else knows what is going on in Sweden.” She explains why the claims for the Nordic model - decriminalisation of workers, less trafficking, and concern for workers and a desire to help not punish them - are rubbish. Ridiculously broad laws affecting sex work remain. Sex can only be sold in the street or in a client’s home, with obvious dangers. Stockholm University Department of Criminology concluded the claimed decline in numbers of men buying sex was fabricated: it was impossible even if every man in Sweden stopped. On the claimed concern, Jakobssen quotes one sex worker: “People despise prostitution ... and this hate extends to the person that says they have chosen it.... [T]o be able to feel empathy ... and to perceive the individual in a positive way, the person must be made a victim, someone ... subjected to the evils of prostitution.... If the person states they have chosen it, it is just a delusion created by another evil person, and the poor foolish person ... has to be saved.... [I]f the person does not want to be saved, they must be persuaded .... [and] made to realise that ... they do not know what is best for them, even ... where they have a positive self-image connected to their sex work” (pp. 33-7).

The report says unequivocally that there should be no coercion, threats or violence, and those wanting to leave should be given every assistance (pp. 4, 12, 13). As Green Party policy says: “All aspects of sex work involving consenting adults should be decriminalised. There should be zero tolerance of coercion, violence or sexual abuse in sex work.” The Greens found no support for the Nordic model, and the Liberal Democrats’ Charlotte Cane said their research made clear that criminalising the purchaser made everything worse: “[T]he state has no role whatsoever in consensual sexual activity between adults” (pp. 62-4).

Canadian, American and international evidence shows that criminalising only part of sex-work relationships is impossible. An experiment in Vancouver, arresting clients but not prostitutes, proved unworkable (pp. 20-4, 26-7). Women Against Rape said the lining-up behind the client criminalisation campaign was sickening: we must respect sex workers’ autonomy to say yes or no; it is not up to the state, church or feminists to say it. Protection from rape, trafficking and exploitation depends on the ability to come forward and report. Criminalising workers, clients or both forces sex work underground and into more danger. Non-violent clients who simply purchase sexual services are an easy target, diverting resources from dealing with violent ones (pp. 57-8). Pippa Grenfell of the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine similarly says that violence, health and reduced access to healthcare are reinforced by criminalising clients, which displaces workers into less safe locations, rushes screening and deters reporting of violence (pp. 51-2).

Niki Adams of the ECP said that presenting client criminalisation as a gender equality issue cannot be sustained: “Gender equality cannot mean attacking men.... It’s ... one sector of women ... [deciding] that they know better than us what’s good for us” (p. 78). And as another sex worker said: “We want the right to work safely and fairly in the work we have decided to do, even if you personally don’t approve of our choices” (p. 26).

Ray Ward
THINKING ON SUNDAY

Start at 11.00 unless specified otherwise.

**May 7**
Beating the Hell out of Fake News
• *Dr Sander van der Linden*

**May 14**
Morality as Cooperation: How Evolution Explains Ethics
• *Dr Oliver Scott Curry*

**May 21**
Prospects for the Palestinians
• *Speaker to be confirmed*

**Jun 4**
The Story of Scepticism
• *Grant Bartley*

**Jun 18**
How Dark Matters Shape the Universe
• *Roger O’Brien*

OTHER EVENTS

**May 4 - May 30**
The Art of Thinking – an Exhibition of Sketchbooks
• Exhibition opening event, The Library, Friday 5 May, 18.30
• Presented by Conway Hall and University of the Arts London

**May 4 - Jun 22**
No Gods No Masters – 8 week course
• 18.30 to 20.30 • Eight Thursday evening sessions
• Presented by Conway Hall Ethical Society

**May 10**
N scale: living memorial and inoperative association
• 19.00 to 21.00 • Performance and commemoration event to launch a year-long art and activism project by Brigid McLeer • Presented by Conway Hall and Brigid McLeer

**May 15**
Radicals – Outsiders Changing the World
• 19.00 to 21.00 • Jamie Bartlett will discuss his new book
• Presented by Conway Hall Ethical Society

**May 24**
War: An Enquiry with A.C. Grayling
• 19.30 to 21.00 • A.C. Grayling will talk about his new book
• Presented by Conway Hall

**May 27**
An Afternoon with Jacqueline Wilson (SOLD OUT)
• 14.00 to 17.00 • Presented by Newham Bookshop with Conway Hall

For ticket prices and other information, please visit [www.conwayhall.org.uk](http://www.conwayhall.org.uk)
## CONWAY HALL SUNDAY CONCERTS

Start at **18.30** unless specified otherwise.

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<tr>
<td>May 7</td>
<td>Ducasse Trio</td>
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<td>* Milhaud, Berg, Arutiunian, Menotti, Shostakovich and Stravinsky</td>
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<td>May 14</td>
<td>Children Workshop with Darren Moore (trumpet)</td>
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<td>May 14</td>
<td>Gildas Quartet</td>
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<td>May 21</td>
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<td>* Bach, Liz Johnson, Shostakovich and Schubert</td>
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<td>May 28</td>
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<td>Jun 4</td>
<td>London Mozart Players &amp; Howard Shelley</td>
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For ticket prices and other information, please visit [www.conwayhall.org.uk/sunday-concerts/](http://www.conwayhall.org.uk/sunday-concerts/)